SOME OBSERVATIONS ON THE CASE OF
PRIVATE WADSWORTH.
In the February number of this magazine I tried to state
my conclusions relative to the meaning of the phrase "martial law" as at present used; and as to the possibility of its
existence in Pennsylvania during the recent strike of the
anthracite coal miners. Briefly, those conclusions were
these: that the civil is a higher law than the military; that
no exception to this proposition is allowed save in time and
place of actual war, when, of necessity, there is no machinery
for the enforcement of the civil law; that these propositions hold true of England, of the United States, and of
the state of Pennsylvania; that, hence, as admittedly the
situation in the coal regions did not amount to war, the
civil law must take cognizance of all violence committed
there, whether by civilian or soldier; and that, therefore,
Private Wadsworth must answer for his act before a civil
tribunal, according to the known law of the land.
Even though I be wrong in my conclusion, however, as to
the non-existence of martial law, it seems that the parties
concerned in the killing of the victim must stand civil trial,
after the exigency has passed. This is conceded by those
who argue most strongly for the existence of martial law.
Thus Birkheimer, who is a strenuous adherent of the
theory that martial law may occur, says: "If it be asked
what security exists against abuse of this summary military
authority, the answer, as before pointed out, is in the amenability of those exercising it not only to military superiors,
but also before the civil tribunals of the country when peace
and order again resume their sway."2 And again, "Yet
the assertion that the power exercised under martial, law is
entirely arbitrary is liable to mislead. It cannot be meant
by this that the authority there exercised by the military
is despotic and irresponsible, nor even that responsibility is
limited to accountability to military superiors alone. And
'AMERICAN LAW REwIsTm, 0. S. Vol. 5i, p. 63.
'Birkheimer, "Military Government and Martial Law," 300.
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herein lies the safety of the community." 3 And finally:
"The safeguards against martial law are not found in the
denial of its protection, but in the amenability of the President to impeachment; of military officers to the civil and
criminal laws and to military law; in the frequent change
of public officers, the dependence of the army upon the
pleasure of Congress, and the good sense of the troops."4
Finlason, the exponent par excellence of the doctrines
of martial law seems to say that civil or criminal proceedings
may be brought against a soldier for (I) cases of utter illegality, through total want of jurisdiction or authority; (2)
cases of acts done during martial law, but not really under
and by virtue of it, that is, not really in pursuance of it, but
under color of it, for private malice and revenge; and (3)
cases of acts done without orders or authority at all. But
he contends that no commander, officer or soldier "lawfully
putting martial law in force under legal declaration of it,
can be legally liable for orders issued or obeyed under and
by virtue of military authority."'
For this proposition he
cites Johnstone v. Sutton.6 This. case, as a glance at the
report will show, has nothing to do with martial law, but
with the power of a civil court to revise the finding of a
court-martial sitting to try a military offence.
Moreover, the distinction attempted in the paragraph
above-quoted from Finlason does not seem valid. After
the three-fold classification of cases wherein a civil court
may try a soldier, there seems very little left which the
civil court cannot investigate. Again, the writer's assumption is rather startling when he begins to talk of "lawfully
putting martial law in force," and a "legal declaration of
it." One would suppose that the lawfulness of it was the
subject under discussion, and if its legality is thus to be
tacitly assumed there is nothing further to discuss.
It being settled, then, that the soldier's guilt or innocence
must depend on the action of a criminal court, constituted
and acting under the constitution and the rules of the com'Ibid., 304.
'Ibid., 3o6.
'Finlason, "A Treatise on Martial Law," 72, note (a).
'i
T. R. 528.
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mon law, we may undertake the discussion of some of the
considerations which must weigh with such court in reaching a just conclusion.
The result, so far as the criminality or innocence of the
defendant's act goes, must depend, it seems, upon the
answers to be given two questions: (I) Were the orders,
under which he acted, lawful orders? If so, then the case is
ended, and the defendant must be acquitted. But if not,
then: (2) Was the illegality of the orders patent to the
defendant, or of such a nature that it should have been patent
to one of his abilities and station, under the circumstances
of the case? Let us proceed to a consideration of these
two inquiries.
I. THE LEGALITY OF THE ORDERS.
If the conclusions reached in my former article are correct, then the military in the coal regions were a sort of
posse comitatus,-with this added, that they were organized
and officered and subordinated to a certain discipline. They
had, as regards the suppression of riot, or the prevention of
a breach of the peace, or of a felony, no higher privileges
than the constabulary. They had the right to meet force
with force, to arrest a felon and if he were escaping to
shoot him to prevent his escape; they had the right, as has
any peace officer to take life to prevent the commission of
a felony. But in all these respects they were peace officers
merely. If either officer or private overstepped the line of
what was strictly necessary to these ends, he was guilty of
a wrongful act. No middle ground is possible,--either there
was peace in the coal regions, in which case these men were
peace officers and amenable to the rules and sanctions of
the criminal code; or there was war in those regions, in
which case the soldier is answerable to no tribunal save by
the will of his commander, under the laws of army discipline.
If the civil law was paramount, does it seem that the governor of the state, who is charged with the execution of its
behests, took the lawful and appropriate method to enforce
it when he wrote this order for the guidance of the general
commanding: "He

.

.

.

will arrest all persons engag-
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ing in acts of violence and intimidation, and hold them
under guard until their release will not endanger the public
peace."7 Surely no sheriff could lawfully give such an
order to his deputies. Is this an indirect attempt, tacitly
to suspend the writ of habeas corpusf If carried out, this
order would certainly place a large part of the government
of the community at the whim of the commanding officer.
It seems that there was no necessity for the arbitrary hold-"
ing of prisoners by the military. No reason is apparent,
why they should not be turned over to the civil arm for
trial and punishment. It may be asked, what corrective is
there for such an illegal order? The answer is,-impeachment.
Consider, then, the order issued by the general in command, in pursuance of the governor's instructions. 8 The
orders are to guard a house that has recently been dynamited. This is reasonable enough. But see what follows.
"If any attempt is made to dynamite them, or they are shot
at or stoned, or any suspicious characters prowl around,'
particularly in the rear of the house, who fail to halt when
directed by the guard, the guard shall shoot and shoot to
kill."
It is submitted that these do not read like the orders of
a peace officer to his subordinates in a country governed
by common law. No ordinary peace officer would have
the right to shoot "if he saw suspicious characters prowling
around." Add to this the fact that the man shot was in
the highway, and that no public warning seems to have
been given or proclamation to have been made that pedestrians should not use the highway at this point, or that
persons visiting the house where the shootinig occurred
should halt when called upon to do so.'
Can it be contended that such orders were lawful? If so,
orders that every man in the region should keep indoors
under pain of death would have been equally lawful. This
is not civil government, but a dictatorship. Surely an
'Italics mine.

For the orders in full, see 51 Am. L. REG., 0. S. 64

(February, 1903).

'The order will be found, 51 Am.L. REG.,

'Italics mine.

0.

S. 65.
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experienced officer should know that he oversteps his authority when he gives such an order. There is no reason why
he should not be made to answer before the law for such
abuse of authority.1 0
Turning now to the case of the private who did the shooting,-if he were put upon trial for the act, what would be
the duty of the court in its instructions to the jury? Clearly
to say to the jury that the orders were illegal. If the orders
to the soldier were to take the life of one engaged in cornmitting a felony; or to save the soldier's own life or those
of others; this would be justifiable by the well-known rules
of the common law. So, also, of shooting to prevent an
escape. If a riot were actually in progress, life could only
be taken to prevent its spread and the consequent loss of
life, and in such case the jury must be the judges of the
necessity of the order, but if there was no open riot in
progress, and no felony being committed and no attempted
escape of a felon, and no imperious necessity of self-defence,
then an order to kill was an unwarranted and illegal order.
II.

CAN DEFENDANT JUSTIFY BY ILLEGAL ORDERS OF HIS
SUPERIOR?

Granting then that the orders were illegal, may they
nevertheless operate to shield defendant from civil or criminal liability?

A great number of cases has answered this question.

It

is conceived that cases where an officer or soldier has been
held civilly liable in spite of a plea of superior's orders are
quite as much in point as those holding him criminally liable.
If a man cannot plead such orders as a justification for an
alleged civil wrong, much less ought he be allowed to do so
where he is indicted for criminal misconduct.
The English cases in point are few. Lord Mansfield
mentions a case of one Gambier,"1 a captain in the
British navy, who, by order of Admiral Boscawen, pulled
down the houses of some sutlers on the coast of Nova
Scotia, who were supplying the sailors with liquors, to the
See Hyde v. Melvin, ii Johns. 521, at p. 523; McCall v. McDowell,
I Abbott, 212.
'Mostyn v. Fabrigas,Cowp. i8o.
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injury of the sailors' health. The order was held unlawful
and the captain was held liable in damages to the sutlers. 12
The earliest American case known to the writer where an
inferior has been held liable civilly in spite of the orders of
a superior is Little v. Barreme,13 decided by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 18o4. Here it appeared that
an act of Congress had authorized the seizure of all American vessels sailing to French ports, and empowered the
President to order the commanders of American naval
vessels to seize and search any vessel suspected of such
destination. The President ordered the seizure of vessels
sailing from as well as to French ports, transmitting to the
captains with the orders a copy of the act; and under such
orders the defendant, a captain of an American vessel, seized
the "Flying Fish." a Danish vessel, which was bound from
a French port. The District Court of the United States
ordered restoration of the vessel but refused damages to
the owner because it thought there was reasonable cause to
believe the vessel to be American. This judgment the Circuit Court reversed, on the ground that, even if an American
vessel, its seizure would have been illegal as it was proceeding from a French port, not to one, as provided in the act
of Congress. Heavy damages were awarded the owners
against the captain defendant. Chief Justice Marshall
delivered the opinion. 14 It will be observed that here no
See, accord, Tobin v. ,Queen, 16 C. B. N. S. 310.
Cranch, z7o.
"In the course of his opinion he said: "I confess the first bias of

132

my mind was very strong in favor of the opinion that, though the
instructions of the executive could not give a right, they might yet
excuse from damages. I was much inclined to think that a distinction
ought to be taken between acts of civil and those of military officers;
and between proceedings within the body of the country and those on
the high seas. That implicit obedience which military men usually
pay to the orders of their superiors, which indeed, is indispensably
necessary to every military system, appeared to me strongly to imply the
principle that those orders, if not to perform a prohibited act, ought
to justify the person whose general duty it is to obey them, and who is
placed by the laws of his country in a situation which, in general,
requires that he should obey them. I was strongly inclined to think
that where, in consequence of orders from the legitimate authority, a
vessel is seized with pure intention, the claim of the injured party for
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question was made of the bona fides of the captain, nor was
the question discussed whether defendant should have
15
known that the order was illegal. In Hyde v. Melvin,
the defendant who was sued in debt for a penalty under a
statute of New York which provided that "no officer shall
call out or cause to appear" any of the militia within a certain time prior to any election, defended on the ground,
inter alia, that he did not know of the statute and that he
acted under the orders of his colonel. The court, while
deciding on other grounds, remarked that this constituted
no excuse, but would only make the colonel equally culpable
with the defendant. In Mitchell v. Harmony' the doctrine
of Little v. Barreme was affirmed.
Despan v. Olney"7 decided in.the first circuit by Justice
Curtis in 1852, seems to mark the first narrowing of the

theory of unconditional liability. There it appeared that
during the Dorr rebellion in Rhode Island, the defendant
came from New York and volunteered for the state militia.

He was given a commission as captain and ordered to Pawtucket. General Anthony ordered him to arrest the plaintiff, who had been a supporter of the rebellion, but had
laid down his arms and was at the time supporting the
regular government. The plaintiff sued the defendant for
unlawful arrest and he defended on the ground that he was
obeying a lawful order. The court charged the jury to this
effect: (I) Martial law existed in Rhode Island at the time
of the commission of the defendant's act.' 8 (2) But martial
damages would be against the government from which the orders
proceeded, and would be a proper subject for negotiation. But I have
been convinced that I was mistaken, and I have receded from this
first opinion. I acquiesce in that of my brethren, .which is, that the
instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, or legalize an
act which, without those instructions, would have been a plain trespass."
1II Johns. 521, 1814.
s 13 How. 115, I85I.
I I Curtis, 3o6.
'This statement was based by Justice Curtis on what he conceived
the Supreme Court of the United States had said in Luther v. Borden,
7 How. i. He attributed to the court the doctrine that a state legislature might declare martial law. A reading of the opinion in that
case will show that the majority expressly refused to commit itself
on this point and that the dissenting judge flatly denied the proposition.
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law is not an absolute defence; its existence only aids the
jury in discovering the intent of the defendant. (3) If he
was guilty of malice, then he is liable. (4) If there was
no malice, then he was justified in following the order,
which was apparently within the scope of his superior's
authority.
It will be noted that this charge lays down a new rule
as to liability for obedience to orders, to wit: that the act
is justifiable if the orders were within the apparent scope
of the officer's authority and there was no malice in its commission. As this was merely a charge to a jury, no authorities are cited.
During the War of the Rebellion certain prisoners were
in the custody of an officer of the Supreme Court of Texas,
pending the hearing of a writ of habeas corpus, for which
they had applied, to determine whether they should be
tried by that court or remanded to the military. Sparks,
a major of the Confederate Army took them from the custody of said officer. The court was asked to issue an
attachment for Sparks. His answer was that he had seized
the prisoners at the orders of the general commanding. The
court held that the prisoners were in the custody of the
court and no authority of any sort existed to take them
from such control, and that the orders did not justify Sparks,
and an attachment should issue.19 The distinction drawn in
Despan v. Olney between orders within or without the
apparent scope of the superior's authority was not men20

tioned.

"State v. Sparks, 27 Tex. 627.
"The court said: "Military officers are bound'to obey all legal orders
of those by whom they are commanded. But there is nothing better

settled, as well by the military as the civil law. than that neither officers
nor soldiers are bound to obey any illegal order of their superior
officers; but, on the contrary, it is their bounden duty to disobey them.

The soldier is still a citizen and as such is always amenable to the civil
authorities." This language is, however, much weakened by what follows: "If, however, he was in truth, acting, as he claims, in obedience
to the orders of the major-general of this military district, it certainly

would go far to excuse him. While an officer must not obey an unlawful order of his superior in command, yet, as in all cases where he
declines obedience to it he acts at his peril, much indulgence should be

shown in extenuation of his obedience to such orders from those he is
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In Weatherspoon v. Woody21 it was said that a subordinate can only justify under his superior's orders when the
circumstances amount to duress.
About this time two very important cases were decided.
The first, Tramwell v. Bassett,22 was an action of trespass
against five soldiers for carrying away plaintiff's goods.
The plea was that defendants were duly enrolled in a company in the Confederate army, and that their captain
ordered the seizure. The plaintiff demurred. A judgment
for the plaintiff thereon was reversed. The court took the
view that the orders were a complete justification, quoting
Vattel to the effect that the soldier's only duty is obedience.
This case stands alone in this extreme position.
The second case attempts, like Despan v. Olney,23 while
holding to the general view that a soldier is liable for obeying illegal orders, to qualify the rule.

The qualification

comes close to a negation of the existence of the rule. In
this case, McCall v. McDowell,2 4 it appeared that at the
time of President Lincoln's assassination, General McDowell,
the military commander of the district of California, issued
orders for the arrest of any one publicly voicing sentiments
of exultation over the president's death. Douglas, a captain, acting under these orders, arrested the plaintiff for
expressing such sentiments. Plaintiff was confined for
some days in military prison. On his release, he brought
an action for damages against McDowell and Douglas. The
court held the order illegal, and, the case being tried without a jury, found against McDowell in compensatory damages, refusing punitive damages because no malice was
shown, and because plaintiff had given great provocation.
The court further held that Douglas was not liable at
all, as he acted under orders. I shall quote from the opinion
ordinarily bound to obey. Especially should this be so, when the order
comes to him from such high authority as that from which the one now
in question is claimed to emanate."
=5 Cold. (Tenn.) i49, 1867.
= 24 Ark. 499, i8M; see also, dictum to same effect: Taylor v.
fenkins, 24 Ark. 337.
= Supra.
51 Abb. C. C. 212, 1867.
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in the note. 5 A glance at the language quoted in the note
will show the court's position. The opinion continues to
the effect that there is no need to give a plaintiff double
redress, and therefore it is sufficient to limit plaintiff's
action to the one really responsible, that is, the officer who
gave the orders.2 6 It is recognized that this is not the rule
in civil law, but it is said that the difference between cases
arising under the civil law and such as this is that in the
former he who gives the command and he who receives it
are, in the eye of the law, equal; the subordinate is a free
agent; while in military life he who is commanded acts
under compulsion. In support of this distinction the court
cites the case of a wife committing crime in the presence of
her husband where she is excused on the ground of compulsion.27 It will be noticed that this case has many features which limit the apparent breadth of the exception.
In the first place it was practically war time and the country
was under great stress. If ever it could be lawful arbi' At p. 218: "Except in a plain case of excess of authority, where at
first blush it is apparent and palpable to the commonest understanding
that the order is illegal, I cannot but think that the law should excuse
the military subordinate when acting in obedience to the orders of his
commander. Otherwise he is placed in the dangerous dilemma of being
liable in damages to third persons for obedience to an order, or to the
loss of his commission and disgrace for disobedience thereto."
"The first duty of a soldier is obedience, and without this there can be
neither discipline nor efficiency in an army. If every subordinate
officer and soldier were at liberty to question the legality of the orders
of the commander, and obey them or not as he may consider them valid
or invalid, the camp would be turned into a debating school, where the
precious moment for action would be wasted in wordy conflicts between
the advocates of conflicting opinions."

' At p.

220.

At p. 221. The court sums up its views thus: "Between an order
plainly legal and one palpably otherwise-particularly in time of warthere is a wide middle ground, where the ultimate legality and propriety of orders depends or may depend upon circumstances and conditions of which it cannot be expected that the inferior is informed or
advised. In such cases, justice to the subordinate demands and the
necessities and efficiency of the public service require, that the order
of the superior should protect the inferior; leaving the responsibility
to rest where it properly belongs-upon the officer who gave the command."
'
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trarily to arrest and confine a man for seditious utterances
this was the time. Secondly the case ws tried without a
jury and the judge was therefore deciding the facts which
would justify the defendant's belief in the legality of the
orders, as well as declaring the law. It is to be noticed also
that the court does not cite the earlier decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States, which certainly went
no such lengths as does this opinion.
The last civil case to be cited is Bates v. Clark,28 decided
in the Supreme Court in 1877. An act of Congress gave
authority to any military officer who had reason to suspect
that liquors had been or were about to be brought into
Indian country, in violation of the law, to search for and
seize the same. The defendants, a captain and lieutenant,
seized some whisky which they thought was being sold
within the confines of the Indian country. They were in
error, and on discovery of the mistake returned the liquor
to its owner. The latter brought trespass against them.
Their defences were (I) innocent mistake, and (2) orders
from their commander. It was held that the first was no
defence, but only excused from punitory damages; and as
to the second that superiors' orders could never justify an
unlawful act in time of peace. No exception was made of
the case of orders apparently within the scope of the officer's
authority, nor was the rule qualified as in McCall v. McDowell.2 9
The civil cases, then, with one exception, lay down the
rule that a soldier cannot justify an unlawful act by the
plea that he committed it under orders. Two cases qualify
this rule, the one by saying that if the orders are within
the apparent scope of the officer's authority they constitute
a justification; the other by saying that unless the order is
obviously and palpably illegal it is a justification.
Let us now turn to the criminal cases. The earliest is
Axtell's Case.30 The memorandum of the case in Kelyng
reads: "That upon the tryal of one Axtell, a soldier, who
commanded the guards at the King's tryal, and at his mur95 U. S. 204.
Supra.

Kelyng, I3.
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der, he justified that all he did was as a soldier, by the command of his superior officer, whom he must obey or die.
It was resolved that was no excuse, for his superior was
a traitor, and all that joyned him in that act were traitors,
and did by that approve the treason; and where the command is traiterous, there the obedience to that command is
also traiterous." 31
32
The first American case is United States v. Jones.
Jones was indicted for feloniously entering a certain Portuguese brig, assaulting the captain and stealing out of said
brig certain articles. Defendant was first lieutenant of a
privateer commissioned by the president of the United
States. It appeared that the captain of the privateer allowed
the boarding and rifling of the brig under the impression
that she was French. She flew the English colors. It was
proved that both vessel and cargo were owned in Portugal
and were bound from Lisbon for New York. One ground
of defence was that defendant presumably acted under the
orders of his superior, the captain. This was held to be no
defence. The court said: "No military or civil officer can
command an inferior to violate the laws of his country;
nor will such command excuse, much less justify the act.
Can it be for a moment pretended, that the general of an
army, or the commander of a ship of war, can order one of
his men to commit murder or felony? Certainly not.
Disobedience of an unlawful order, must fiot, of course, be
punishable; and a court-martial would, in such a case, be
bound to acquit the person tried upon a charge of disobedience. We do not mean to go further than to say,
that the participation of the inferior officer, in an act which
he knows, or ought to know, to be illegal, will not be
excused by the order of his superior."
The case of People v. McLeod,33 recognized the principle
that the command of, or the ratification of, an act by a foreign potentate does not excuse his soldier for obeying such
command if his act would otherwise constitute a crime.
In Comm. v. Blodgett84 it was held that soldiers cross'See also, U. S. v. Greiner, 4 Phila. 396.
3 Wash. C. C. 209, 1813.
i Hill (N. Y.) 379, i84; at p. 426.
12 Met. (Mass.) 56, 1846.
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ing from Rhode Island to Massachusetts, to capture fugitives from the former state, were guilty of an unlawful act
and that they could not justify under the commands of
their superiors, because this was an act of war; and, if so,
they could only be excused if Massachusetts might look to
Rhode Island for redress, that is, if this act of war had
been commanded by the supreme authorities of Rhode
Island.
In United States v. Carr,35 a soldier was shot as a result
of a quarrel between several soldiers in a military post.
There was some evidence that the victim was running away
at the time the shot was fired, and that the prisoner was
ordered to fire by the ranking sergeant. The court charged:
"Nor will any order of a superior officer to an inferior in
rank justify the willful killing of a person under the peace
and protection of the law. A soldier is bound to obey only
the lawful orders of his superiors. If he receives an order
to do an unlawful act, he is bound neither by his duty nor
his oath to do it. So far from such order being a justification, it makes the party giving the order an accomplice in
the crime. For instance, an order from an officer to a
soldier to shoot another for disrespectful words merely,
would, if obeyed, be murder, both in the officer and
soldier."3 6
The last case bearing on the subject is In re Fair, 7
which, while not directly in point, quotes with approval the
language quoted above from McCall v. McDowell, thus
recognizing the rule that for the soldier to be liable his
superior's order must be palpably illegal to a man in his
station.38
'31 Woods, 48o, 1872.
'See also, Riggs, v. State, 3 Cold. (Tenn.) 85; U. S. v. Greiner,
4 Phila. 396.
"ioo

Fed. i49, 19oo.

In this case the defendants had been tried by a court martial for
shooting an escaping prisoner. After acquittal they were arrested by
the state authorities. They asked for their release on habeas corpus,
because, if they were guilty of a crime triable by a civil court, such
civil court must be a court of the United States and not a state ccturt,
since they were in the service of the United States. This was the main
and vital point, and the discussion as to the justification of superior
orders was really only dictum.
'
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From these authorities it seems that some courts have
made the soldier no exception to the rule that a man acts
at his peril in the restraint of the liberties or the taking of
the life of his fellows; that if he transgresses he must
answer for his wrong, and that it is no better answer for
him to give, than for a civil officer, that he acted under
orders. Other cases seem to grant something to the necessities of discipline in an army, and to say that if the soldier,
as a reasonable man, could not be expected to know the
order was illegal, then the fact that he acted under that order
ought to be a justification of his act.
Perhaps the latter is the fairer view. If it be so, what
follows? That in the case under discussion the facts must
be submitted to a jury, with an instruction that the orders
were unnecessary and illegal, but that if they find that such
illegality would not be patent to a man in defendant's position, and that defendant acted without malice in their execution, then they must acquit him. It is safe to trust to the
judgment and good sense of American juries to give the
defendant the most liberal treatment in such cases.
It may be said, then why have the rule if a jury is likely
to acquit in this case? The answer is that the minute you
make a rule of law that orders justify, you paralyze the
arm of the civil law, and render it possible to cloak the
vilest abuses of power under the pretence of a superior's
commands. In such cases, again, the sense of a jury may
be trusted to accomplish the conviction of him who falsely
attempts to shield his own malicious motives behind the
mask of military authority. Granting the most liberal construction given the rule by any of the cases, can the case
ever be taken from the jury in a criminal trial? Must they
not always, under appropriate instructions as to the legality
of the orders, be asked with what intent the deed was done,
and if they find no malice, then be required to say whether
a reasonable man would under the circumstances have
known the order to be either malicious or clearly illegal?
To the writer it seems there can be but one answer. The
jury must pass upon the case.
Owen J. Roberts.

